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INTRODU CTlON 
It is widely known that Leibniz was severely critical of Descartes's use of the 
notions of clear and distinct (versus obscure and confused) ideas. Commen- 
tators frequently cite with approval Leibniz's various statements that a 
"criterion" or  "mark" of clarity and distinctness is required, if the notions are 
to have any epistemological value. Leibniz's own, very pervasive, use of the 
notions of distinctness and confusion in ideas is less frequently examined. 
With the exception of some excellent, but largely expository work by Robert 
McRae, this aspect of Leibniz's philosophy does not seem to  have received 
much systematic consideration in the English language literature.' I believe 
that this relative neglect is unwarranted. One purpose of the present paper is 
to argue that Leibniz's treatment of confused and distinct cognitions involves 
a very fundamental advance over Descartes's, although the feature in 
question is not one that Leibniz himself stressed. Unlike Descartes, Leibniz 
fairly consistently observes a distinction between concepts on the one hand, 
and particular presentings on the other hand.2 (His position can therefore be 
construed as an important and perhaps influential antecedent t o  Kant's 
celebrated distinction between intuitions and concepts.) That is, Leibniz 
defines 'confused' and 'distinct' in one way to distinguish different levels of 
conceptual ability, and in another way to  distinguish (alleged) features of 
perceptions. (There is also a third sense of 'confused'in Leibniz's writings that 
may apply to both categories of cognition.3) It is particularly interesting to 
compare Leibniz's treatment of sensory ideas with Descartes's. Leibniz, like 
Descartes, regards sense perceptions as necessarily and ineluctably confused; 
and he also uses sensory concepts as paradigms of the sort of confusion that 
may be ascribed to one's conceptual repertoire. Recognition of the fact that 
he does not regard the two as "confused" in the same sense of the term is 
important both in interpreting some puzzling Leibnizian passages, and in 
understanding his relation to Descartes. After developing these points in 
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more detail, I will go on to  discuss critically Leibniz's notion of confused 
concepts, and his use of sensory paradigms in this connection. I will not, 
however, attempt to  evaluate in any detail his theory of confused perception; 
nor will I consider here his most central and original use of the notion of 
confusedness: his doctrine that every substance "expresses in a confused way" 
all of its past and future states, and everything that happens in its world. The 
latter notions certainly merit critical examination, and they are closely inter- 
related with the points I d o  discuss. They are so complex and difficult, 
however, that they seem to  demand separate and systematic treatment. 
I will begin with a brief review of relevant features of Descartes's position. 
Descartes speaks variously of clear and distinct (or obscure and confused) 
knowledge, comprehension, ideas, perceptions, conception, notions, and so 
forth. In the Principles a "clear perception" is defined as one "that is present 
and open t o  an  attending mind: just as we say that that is clearly seen by us, 
which, being present to the viewing eye, affects it sufficiently strongly and 
openly"(1, xlv: A T  VIII-I, 21-22}. A "distinct perception" is one which is not 
only clear, but also "so separate (sejuncta) from all others and (so) precise, 
that it contains in itself nothing else a t  all, except what is clear" (ibid., 22). A 
perception that is not d e a r  and distinct is obscureand confused. The terms of 
these definitions suggest that what is a t  issue is the way in which particular 
entities are presented to the mind-as of course does the word 'perception' 
itself. And, in fact, in the next Principle Descartes proceeds to  apply his 
distinction t o  the "perception of a pain." Two points need to  be noted, how- 
ever. First, Descartes thinks we clearly and distinctly perceive things (e.g., the 
nature of a body) "by the understanding," and he implies (for instance in the 
"wax passage" towards the end of Meditation 11) that achieving clarity and 
distinctness in one's cognition is a t  least partly a matter of getting straight 
about what is contained in one's basic concepts. Second, while Descartes 
invariably characterizes sense perceptions-or a t  least those not "exhibiting" 
extension, figure, or motion-as confused, it is not a t  all evident how his 
definition of the "distinct" fails to apply to them. In what way do  the), 
"contain in themselves" what is not clear?"n fact, what he usually seems to  
mean in calling sensations "confused" is that they have very limited cognitive 
content (if any): they d o  not "exhibit to us""rea1"properties in any intelligible 
way. (Similarly, Descartes's original sensible notion of the wax was amiss, not 
because there were undistinguished elements of the sense experience(s), but 
because the true (intelligible) notion of wax was not yet before his mind's 
eye.)' What Descartes should probably say is that our "perception" (under- 
standing) of the nature of body, and of physical properties, is confused insofar 
as we rely on sense perceptions. Only internal reflection and analysis enable 
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us to grasp accurately "what is contained in" the idea of body, and distin- 
guishes body "from all else." Sense perceptions, or sensations, can themselves 
be called "confused," within Cartesian parameters, only by a sort of conflation. 
They fail to help us toward the distinct and conceptually perfect understand- 
ing of the nature of things that our innate ideas can ultimately yield, once the 
discerning "attention of the mind" is directed toward them. This observation 
is very important to understanding the major differences between Descartes's 
position and that of Leibniz. 
Leibniz too uses 'clear,"distinct,"confused,'and 'obscure'to qualify a wide 
range of terms: 'idea,' 'expression,' 'representation,' 'notion,' 'cognition,' 
'perception,' 'thought,' even 'attribute,' to mention some of the most important 
examples. But whereas Descartes seems to  move from talk of clear and 
distinct x's to talk of clear and distinct y's without observing any definite and 
significant distinctions, this is not a t  all the case with Leibniz. Although 
certain qualifications will have to  be spelled out later, it is generally the case 
that when Leibniz talks of distinct or confused notions o r  ideas, he has in 
mind questions about conceptual abilities. When he speaks of distinct or 
confused perceptions, on the other hand, he is concerned with features of 
particular-presentings. Confusion in our ideas is to  a considerable extent 
correctable; but the sort of confusion found in perceptions is largely ineluc- 
table, unremovable: indeed, it belongs to the nature of the perceptions 
themselves. I will now consider these two types of "confusion" in turn-with 
brief mention of a third sense of'confusion'that may apply more broadly than 
the other two. 
According to  the Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas, we have a 
clear but confused notion or idea of things of a certain sort (say $'s), if we can 
recognize them when we encounter them, but cannot explain what distin- 
guishes them from other entities (see P.S. IV, 422). Our notion is distinct as  
well as clear if we can state a "mark" of Qness-in other words give an 
account of our  ability to  pick out 4's. This essay dates from 1684. In a much 
later work, the New Essays, Leibniz makes the same point, saying that we 
have a distinct idea when we can give "the definition or  thereciprocal marks" 
(11, xxxi, $8 1,2: D A  ed,, p. 266).6 The one exception to  this rule is constituted 
by genuinely "primitive" notions; as  Leibniz writes: 
There is, however, also a dlst~nct cognition of an indefinablenotion, when ~t isprirnitrve or 
known by itself, that IS, when ~t IS ~rresolvable and only understood through ~tself . 
(P.S. IV, 423) 
Leibniz identifies the primitives with "the absolute Attributes of God" (ibid., 
425). 
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It seems evident that these distinctions between clear and obscure, and 
distinct and confused ideas are distinctions of conceptual abilities. I can be 
said to "have" the concept of a Darwin tulip, for example, if I can pick out, 
identify, Darwin tulips reliably. I have the concept in a fuller sense if I can 
perform the further feat of providing explicit identifying marks of this type of 
tulip. It is also possible to ascribe to someone a sort of marginal possession of 
a concept, when he can make some accurate marginal use of a term: this 
would correspond to having an obscure idea, as opposed to having no idea 
at all. Thus I may have an obscure idea of a Darwin tulip if I know, at least, 
that it is not the same thing as a Parrot tulip, that it is much larger than a 
Botanical, and so forth. Lacking all these abilities I can hardly be said to 
possess the concept of a Darwin tulip at all-even though I may feel some 
faint cognitive stirrings of recollection when I hear the term used. 
According to Leibniz, "ideas of one sense," like red, sour, or warm, must be 
denied the status of primitives. (It would certainly be hard to see how they 
could be counted among "the absolute Attributes of God.") But the same 
distinctions apply. Therefore our ideas of these qualities must count as 
confused insofar as we are unable to articulate distinguishing marks. Thus, I 
have a clear but confused idea of red if I can identify or pick out red things, but 
cannot state a mark of redness (see, e.g., P.S. IV, 422). 
This way of looking at the confused-distinct distinctions has no strict 
parallels in Descartes's writings. As observed above, Descartes does relate the 
notion of "distinctness" to that of distinguishing: a distinct idea enables us to 
distinguish its "object7' from all else. But Descartes is surely not concerned 
like Leibniz with the problem of recognizing presented particulars-with 
concept "application" or use of "kind terms" in the usual sense. Rather, he is 
concerned with establishing on an a priori level the difference between (say) 
the natures of mind and of matter, between mere sensation and real qualities 
of bodies. Whether or not we conclude that Leibniz succeeded in making the 
notion of a distinct idea more philosophically valuable than Descartes, he 
should no doubt be given credit7 for recognizing the significance of the issue 
of conceptual competence in relation to (actually or possibly) presented 
entities, 
Before turning to the Leibnizian notion of "confusion" that applies 
specifically to perceptions, I would like to mention a third sense of the term 
that Leibniz may take to apply to both ideas and perceptions. The state of a 
mind (or mind-like substance) is called "confused" by Leibniz when it is 
wholly unconscious. Even monads naturally incapable of consciousness have 
"confused perceptions" in this sense. Thus, bare monads are said to express 
or perceive confusedly everything that happens in their world-and also 
completely to lack consciousness and sensation.8 It is, of course, unproble- 
matic that 'confused perception' and 'confused expression' are used by 
Leibniz in this sense. But Leibniz also speaks of unconscious ideas (a concept, 
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he says in one place, is a conscious idea).' And he sometimes identifies ideas as 
"expressions."~o It is possible, therefore, that he might be prepared to speak 
of "confused ideas," in the sense of implicit or unrecognized conceptual 
abilities. I am, however, unable to cite direct textual support for this suggestion. 
But 'confused' also carries another sense in Leibniz's writings. While this 
sense is related to the one just considered, it definitely applies specifically to 
perceptions, as opposed to conceptual abilities. In this important sense, a 
perception is confused when the person perceiving is conscious of it, but is not 
conscious of "all that is in it," of theelements that "compose" it. Leibniz holds 
that all sense perceptions are confused in this sense; that is, all are composed 
of "elements" that we d o  not-and in fact cannot-distinguish or discern." 
The "simplicity" or homogeneity of such perceptions is therefore only 
apparent. 
I pointed out above that Descartes, while treating sense perceptions as 
"confused," provides no way of understanding how they fail to satisfy his 
definition of a distinct idea, as "containing nothing at all within it except 
what is clear." Notice now that on Leibniz's account sense perceptions do  
satisfy the original Cartesian conception of confusion. It is not the case that 
"all that is in them" is clear to the perceiving mind. 
Leibniz offers several different reasons for this rather extraordinary 
doctrine. One type of reason has to do with his conception of the cause-effect 
relation. According to Leibniz the "effect corresponds to the causev-i.e., 
everything present in the cause must have some corresponding element in the 
effect.12 But the "motions" that cause sknse-perceptions-considered either in 
the object or in the body-are indefinitely, indeed infinitely, complex.13 
Hence corresponding complexity must be present in the sensation that 
results from these motions, even if we are not aware of it and cannot become 
aware of it. 
Other lines of reasoning to the same conclusion~4 derive directly from the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Continuity, respectively. 
Descartes had held the position that there was only an arbitrary connection 
between experienced sensations on the one hand, and the events in the brain 
that give rise to them on the other hand. Leibniz rejects this view as contrary 
to the rational order of things. It is, he says, "not the custom of God to act with 
so little order and reason."f5 If all sensations were really simple, Leibniz seems 
to believe, the notion of an arbitrary relation would be unavoidable. If we 
suppose an implicit complexity in sensation, however, we may then further 
suppose that there is some rational or intelligible relation between, say, the 
complex physical "cause" of the sensation of yellow and that sensation 
itself-a relation that does not obtain between that cause and some other 
sensation (say the sensation of blue).l6 
Leibniz argues also from the Principle of Continuity that every perception 
of which we are aware must be composed of parts of which we are not aware. 
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For instance he comments in the New Essays: "that which is noticeable must 
be composed of parts which are not, (since) nothing can arise suddenly, 
thought no more than movement" (11, i, §IS: D.A. ed., p. 117; cf. 11, ix, $4: 
p. 134). He wants to claim, then, that we cannot go "tout d'un coup" from a 
state of zero perception to a state of perceiving consciously; such abrupt 
transitions are not permitted by the Principle of Continuity. The suggested 
alternative seems to be that a conscious perception emerges from a sort of 
temporal summation of "pe~itesperceptions" which belong to and contribute 
to the whole although they are not separately discerned-either in it, or as its 
conditions. 
Additional considerations Leibniz adduces on behalf of his theory of 
sensation include the claim that we know that green is acomposite of blue and 
yellow, yet green appears no less "simple" than the other two colors. (Thus 
apparent simplicity does not entail actual simplicity.)17 Also, Leibniz 
mentions the example of a spinning cog wheel: as the wheel moves faster we 
are increasingly unable to discriminate the individual cogs, and eventually 
we "perceive" only a homogeneous blur.18 His suggestion, I take it, is that 
there is no good reason to deny that the individual cogs contribute any less to 
our perception when they are moving fast than when they are moving slowly.19 
We should conclude rather that they contribute to and are implicit in our 
"blur" perception, even though not individually discerned. Sensory percep- 
tions, such as color, odor, sound, etc., should be understood analogously. 
Leibniz states very explicitly-especially in the New Essays-that the 
confusedness of sense perceptions is essential to them: 
[Colors, tastes, etc.] merit [the] name of phantoms, ratherthan that of qualities, or  even of 
ideas, . . . To wish that these confused phantoms remain, and that nevertheless one dis- 
tlnguishes (dem2le) their ingredients by the phantasy itself, is to contradict oneself; it IS to  
want t o  have the pleasure of being deceived by an agreeable perspective, and to  wish that at 
the same time the eye see the deception, whlch would be to spoil ~ t .  (Ibid., pp. 403-404) 
What this passage does not tell us is whether it is possible to  "distinguish the 
ingredients" of sense perceptions by the "phantasy," supposing one is willing to 
give up the initial experience of the "phantom." In one place Leibniz suggests 
that we fail t o  perceive petites perceptions only because we are distracted by 
their multitude, or because they are effaced or obscured by greater percep- 
tions.20 This way of talking seems to leave open the possibility that by a 
special effort of mind we could become aware of the elements of which our 
perceptions of blue (for example) are composed. But Leibniz does not actually 
say this, and the view seems extremely implausible. Perhaps he means to hold 
that ij- we could, per  impossibile, reduce our experience at a given time to a 
handful ofpetitesperceptions, there would be nothing to rule out ourbecoming 
aware of them. But in fact there will always be an overwhelming multitude in 
any sense perception, and the mind in this situation is helpless to distinguish 
them.21 
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My argument so far has proceeded as if the distinction between confused 
ideas and confused perceptions were (at least textually) perfectly sharp and 
unproblematic. Now it is necessary to  take account of some of the qualifica- 
tions I mentioned at the outset. First, it must be conceded that throughout the 
New Essays Leibniz speaks of "ideas of sense" being confused in the sense of 
being constituted out of petitesperceprions, of which we are unaware. (Note 
the use of the term 'idea' in the passage quoted in the previous paragraph.) I 
do not think this fact in itself is of any great significance. Locke, of course, 
speaks of "ideas of sense," meaning sensory experiences; Leibniz simply falls 
into his antagonist's t e r m i n ~ l o g y . ~ ~  But there is another problem of greater 
importance. Even in the Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas, with 
Locke nowhere in view, Leibniz seems to run together his thesis that sensory 
perceptions are confused (implicitly complex) with the claim that we cannot 
provide a "distinguishing mark" for picking out their qualities. He writes: 
Cognition [cognitro] IS . . . clear when it glves me the abihty to recognize the thing repre- 
sented, and clear [cognition] in turn is either confused or  distinct. It is confused when I 
cannot separately enumerate marks sufficient to discriminate the thing from others, even 
though the thing really has such marks and requisites, into which ~ t s  notion can be resolved: 
thus colors, odors, tastes, and other particular objects of the senses we indeed recognize 
sufficiently clearly and discrlm~nate from each other, but by the simple testimony of the 
senses, and not by statable marks; hence we cannot explain to a bhnd man what red IS, nor 
can we explaln such things to others, except by bringing them into the presence of the 
thing, and causing them to see, smell or taste it . . . . even though it IS certaln that the 
notions of these qualities a re  composite and can be resolved, since they surely have thew 
causes. (P.S. IV, 422-423; emphasis in text) 
In this passage, and others like it, Leibniz runs together the two main 
senses of 'confused' that I have distinguished, to obtain the thesis that we have 
only "confused ideas" of "the objects of the senses." Thus, as the last few lines 
of the quotation reveal, the implicit compositeness of sensory experiences is 
taken to rule out the view that sensory ideas or notions are primitive.23 The 
necessary confusedness of our perceptions of colors, odors, etc., is then taken 
to show that we only (can only?) have confused ideas of these qualities. For 
the confusion of these sensory experiences is such that we are unable to 
"notice in them" any mark that would enable us to say how red, for instance, 
is distinguished from green. Because our experience of these qualities can 
never be freed of "confusion," we cannot convert our conceptual power of 
mere recognition to that capacity for articulate explication signaled by the 
ascription of a distinct idea. Thus we cannot "explain to a blind man what 
red is." 
I believe that Leibniz gets involved in a confusion in this and similar 
passages. To see that this is so, consider first the question where the physical 
theory of sensible qualities could fit into Leibniz's account. On the one hand, 
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the view that sense experiences are "confused" (implicitly complex) is based 
to a considerable extent on the view that these experiences stand in some 
unique relation (causal or expressive) to the indefinitely complex motions 
in bodies postulated by theoretical physics. Yet on the other hand, the running 
together of the claim that our sense experiences are confused, with the claim 
that our concepts of sensory qualities are confused, seems to negate the 
possibility of a physical-theoretical account of sensible qualities. For  if we are 
allowed to suppose that a red object, for  example, is just one that reflects light 
waves of such and such frequency in such and such circumstances, there is no 
obvious reason why we could not ascribe to ourselves adistinct notion of red, 
even on the supposition that our (sense) perceptions are all confused. We 
would be able t o  say, for instance, that red objects differ from all others in 
that rhey reflect wave-lengths in range I?  - I,. Further, on this physical or 
scientific understanding of 'red' there is no barrier a t  all to  explaining to a 
blind man "what red isw-since, presumably, he can understand physical 
optics as well as the next person. (His ideas, too, could come to be distinct.) 
In other words, the doctrine that our sense experiences of colors, odors, etc., 
are all confused will lead to the conclusion that our concepts of these qualities 
are all confused, only if the qualities are somehow identified with the experi- 
ences (or if we lack cognitive resources other than direct sensing), 
Leibniz himself does, in a number of places, formulate theoretical identifi- 
cations of sensory qualities with (potentially) describable states of physical 
objects. Thus he suggests that red may be the "revolving of certain small 
globules," and heat may beUthe expansion of air."24 With respect to  colors, he 
specifically indicates that distinct ideas may be derived from optics, and that 
there is n o  barrier to instructing the blind in this science.25 These statements 
might lead one to suppose that his linking of confused perceptions with 
confused ideas (in the Meditations and  elsewhere) is meant to  be contingent 
upon a low level of scientific understanding. That is, he could be saying in 
such passages that sense experiences alone will not provide distinct concepts 
of sensory qualities; that someone ignorant of optics cannot "explain to  a 
blind man what red is," even though such a person can easily recognize red 
things. In my view, this is what he should be saying, in order to  maintain a 
coherent position. There is evidence, however, that Leibniz did not have one 
consistent way of thinking about sensory qualities, and hence that such a 
rationalization of the Medirations passage is misleading. For  even in passages 
where Leibniz seems to  endorse the possibility of physical-theoretical 
accounts of sensible qualities, he still denies that one can know what red or  
heat is unless one has the appropriate sensations. (In these passages he tends 
to alternate between saying that the physical state is red or  heat, and saying 
that the physical state causes red or heat.) For example, in On the Elements of 
Natural Science (1682-1684) he first proposes that heat must ultimately be 
understood in terms of physical theory: 
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Simple attributes . aresimple by their own natureand forrntellectual reasons, or they are 
simple with respect to our senses. As an example of an attribute simple in nature can be 
offered 'to be itself'or 'to endure.' An at tr~bute simple with respect to the senses. on the 
other hand. would be heat, for the senses d o  not show us by what mechanism the state ofa  
body is produced which bringsabout the sensation of warmth In us. yet the mind properly 
percerves that warmth is not someth~ng absolute whrch is understood in Itself but that ~t 
will only then be adequately understood when we explain of what ~t conststs or distinctly 
descrrbe its prox~mate cause--perhaps the expanslon of air, or rather some partrcular 
motlon of a fluid whrch IS thrnner than arr. (Loemker, p. 285)" 
Yet in the next breath Leibniz is telling us that we know what heat or  light is, 
only if we actually have the sensation of heat or of light: 
Confused attrrbutes are those which are indeed composrte In themselves or by ~ntellectual 
pr~nciples but are srmple to the senses and whose def~nrtion therefore cannot be explained. 
These attrrbutes can be imported not by descriptton but only by pornting them out to the 
senses f I bid.) 
He goes on to  indicate that cold-blooded people in a sunless land could not 
"be made to understand what heat is merely by describing it"; to "learn what 
heat is" they would have t o  experience it-for instance by having a fire 
kindled near them. "Similarly," Leibniz concludes, "a man born blind could 
learn the whole optics yet not acquire any idea of light" (ibid.). 
Leibniz tends to alternate, then, between saying that we can, through 
physics, develop distinct, verbally communicable ideas of sensible qualities, 
and indicating that we can acquire the ideas of these qualities only through 
"confused" sensory experiences (whence it follows that the ideas themselves 
are confused or uncommunicable). Similarly, he vacillates between saying 
that physics tells us what sensible qualities are or consist in, and saying that 
physics tells us the causes of sensible qualities. Insofar as he inclines to the 
former view, he thinks of sensible qualities as properties in physical objects 
that happen to  be discriminable by the senses. Insofar as he inclines to the 
latter view, he thinks of the nature of a sensible quality as completely bound 
up with the nature of sensory experience (cf. the talk of "confused attributes" 
in the passage just quoted).27 
This ambivalence about sensory qualities seems to  be a n  unrationalized, 
pervasive feature of Leibniz's thinking. It tends to muddle his discussions of 
confused ideas, by conflating the confusedness proper to  concepts (on 
Leibniz's own account) with that proper to perceptions. It is perhaps worth 
remarking, however, that the ambivalence in question is hardly trivial or 
idiosyncratic. It reflects, to borrow some phrases, the superposition of the 
manifest image on the scientific image, the naive on the causal viewpoint. 
Thus, we do not naturally think of "perceived red" as just a sensation like 
pain. For  we perceive it in the objects of the manifest image. From this point 
of view it is natural to  think of it as a quality in its own right, that happens to 
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be completely bound up with perceptual experience. From this point of view, 
to "know what red is" does require seeing red. The peculiar thing about 
Leibniz is that he can move so flexibly between the manifest and scientific 
images-even within a paragraph or two-in considering the issue of "what 
red is." It is amazing that he was able t o  overlook such a conspicuous appear- 
ance of inconsistency. (Descartes's contempt for the manifest image was 
deeper and more consistent: for Descartes, perceived red is a "confused" 
sensation and nothing else.) 
There is also, I think, another way of understanding Leibniz's ambivalent 
treatment of sensory qualities. This is found in his way of categorizing con- 
ceptual abilities as confused o r  distinct. Following Cartesian dogma, Leibniz 
seems to assume automatically that one's "idea" cannot be distinct without 
being clear, though it can be clear without being distinct. Given Leibniz's 
definitions, this hierarchical ordering would have the consequence that while 
one can be able t o  recognize without being able to  state a mark, one cannot 
state a mark unless one is able to  recognize. Now the blind person in the 
normal course of things does not have the ability to pick out or recognize red 
objects in his environment. It follows, on the stated assumptions, that he does 
not have a confused idea of red. Ergo (on this line of reasoning) he must lack a 
distinct one: there has t o  be a sense in which he does not "know what red is." 
I d o  not mean to claim, of course, that Leibniz's treatment of knowledge of 
sensory qualities is consistently dominated by such a hierarchical assumption 
about the classification of ideas. As we have seen, he does sometimes say in so 
many words that a blind man can have a distinct conception of colors. The 
point, again, is just that his ambivalence can be understood in light of certain 
conflicting assumptions or perspectives, which may to some extent alternate 
in his thought. 
T o  sum up the main points of my interpretation: Leibniz, in treating the 
issue of clarity and distinctness, recognizes clearly if implicitly a distinction 
between conceptual abilities and features of particular presentings or per- 
ceptions. In the case of the latter, Leibniz's theory of sense perception enables 
us to see why the term "confused" is supposed to  be generally applicable- 
whereas Descartes's fails to d o  so. However, Leibniz's distinction between 
confused concepts and confused perceptions is blurred in those passages 
where he uses cognition of qualities proper to one sense as paradigms of 
"both" types of confusion. What is important t o  recognize, however, is that 
insofar as sensory qualities are identified through the concepts of physics (as 
Leibniz frequently does identify them) the (alleged) ineluctable confusion in 
our sense-perception of them does not a t  all entail that our ideas o r  notions of 
them must be confused. T o  lose sight of this fact (as Leibniz himself some- 
times does) is to lose sight of one of the more satisfactory and historically 
significant features of Leibniz's epistemology: the distinction between the 
categories of conceptual abilities and perceptions. 
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I turn now to  some questions of evaluation. As I indicated at the outset, I will 
not undertake here any systematic evaluation of the complicated theory that 
sense perceptions are "confused"-though I will conclude with a few peripheral 
remarks concerning it. I believe, however, that some fairly conclusive obser- 
vations can be made concerning Leibniz's manner of defining the distinction 
between confused and distinct notions, and will take up that issue first. 
It seems evident that any serious account of concept-possession must 
accord some fundamental place to  a person's ability to  recognize presented 
particulars as 4's o r  $'s. Leibniz's focus on this level of ability makes good 
sense. Further, it seems unproblematic that there is a way of "knowing what 
4's are" that goes beyond merely being able to  recognize 4's. One of Leibniz's 
favorite examples is convincing: an  assayer has a much better knowledge of 
~lhat  gold is than I do, even though I can generally recognize gold objects 
when I encounter them. While there seems to be no good philosophical 
reason for retaining the Cartesian terminology, we can hardly deny Leibniz 
the right to stipulate that mere recognitional ability counts as a "confused 
idea," while something more, such as the assayer's knowledge of gold, is 
required for one's idea to  count as distinct.18 
The problem lies in trying to  lay down conditions on the "something more" 
in a way that  seems really to  support a n  epistemically significant distinction. 
There are, after all, very few sorts of cases where recognitional ability is 
~)hoI!1, divorced from the ability to  state some salient features of the sort of 
thing one can recognize. And I d o  not think it is clear that such minimal 
articulateness with respect to 4's should be one of the two or three major 
criteria of whether and to  what degree one "knows what 6's are." D o  we want 
to say, on the other hand, that a person has a distinct idea of 4's just in case he 
can state a necessary and sufficient condition of 4-ness-a "reciprocal mark," 
as Leibniz suggests in one place? This proposal seems both too weak and too 
strong. Too  weak, because such knowledge could in many cases be relatively 
trivial. Thus, I might know that a certain species of mammal (of which I 
happen to  have heard the name) is the only one in existence with greenish 
toenails-and know absolutely nothing else about these mammals. It would 
be ridiculous to  compare my knowledge of this species with the assayer's 
knowledge of gold. The proposal seems too strong, on the other hand, 
because one can know so very much about different types of entities, without 
being able to produce with any great confidence a list of properties that 
members of each type have in common, and share (as a set) with no other 
entities. It seems that Leibniz's conception of a distinct idea or notion is not 
sufficiently developed to bear very heavy epistemological weight. 
Leibniz's way of distinguishing confused and distinct ideas is also objec- 
tionable precisely because of its implication that our ideas of sense (of the 
134 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
manifest image) are on exactly the same regrettable epistemological footing 
as our most minimal abilities to recognize animals and flowers. Even if one 
should grant Leibniz his claim that sensory perceptions are "confused" in the 
relevant sense (i.e., implicitly complex), it still does not seem true that our 
inability to state a mark of (manifest) redness is the same sort of problem as a 
given person's inability to state a mark by which to recognize a particular type 
of bird or tree. In the latter case, but not the former, there exists the real 
possibility of converting one's idea from "confused" to  "distinct" by reflection 
on, and generalization from, one's direct experience (sensory presentings) of 
the entities in question. In the former case, as we have seen, the story is far 
more complicated. Leibniz's position o n  the nature and knowledge of sensory 
qualities involves a lot of philosophy, a lot of (not always consistent) theo- 
retical commitments. His effort to  assimilate this issue to  the distinction 
between recognitiona1 and articulate knowledge of "what 4's are" is both 
oversimplifying and highly misIeading. 
Leibniz's distinction between confused and distinct perceptions is much 
harder to evaluate than the distinction between confused and distinct notions, 
partly because it is more obscure and difficult and partly because it is much 
more fundamental to Leibniz's system. In the present context I will makejust 
a few observations. First, we should resist the temptation to reject out of hand 
the claim that sense perceptions are "confused" (on the grounds that the 
notion of a perception or perception-part of which we can never become 
aware is inconsistent). Leibniz's petites perceptions, like the Kantian mani- 
fold which they prefigure,29 are postulated because of the dictates of a fairly 
deeply thought-out theory. To  know what t o  think about them we must try to  
understand the theory first. Second, one could agree that the arguments 
Leibniz presents, in the New Essays and elsewhere, forthe implicit complexity 
of all sense perceptions, involve unacceptable or  dubious general principles, 
without necessarily dismissing his theory. The central issue that must be 
addressed is the following: are there any grounds a t  all for inferring from 
complexity in the object, cause, or conditions of a n  experience on the one 
hand, to complexity in the experience itself on the other hand? Rationalist 
principles about the cause-effect relation, or about God's "custom," provide 
a handy basis for a positive answer. The question retains some interest, 
however, even if one rejects these principles as a basis for argument. Some- 
times Leibniz himself seems to  present it as simply a fact about perception 
that we could not perceive the result of the co-action of minute motions if we 
did not perceive the minute motions themselve~.~' This is a view that might be 
analyzed and evaluated independently of general dogma about the corre- 
spondence of effect to  cause. 
Finally, we should notice that Leibniz's theory of the implicit complexity 
of sense experiences follows directly from his account of representation or 
expression, together with the view that perception is a form of representation 
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or expression.3' That is, the theory of confused perceptions can be directly 
derived from this aspect of Leibniz's position without benefit of any rationalist 
premisses about the cause-effect relation in general," or God's rational 
ordering of things. In other words, to reject the view of sense perception as 
intrinsically confused, one must either reject Leibniz's theory of representa- 
tion or expression, or deny that sense perception is a form of representation 
or expression. According to  Leibniz, one thing expresses another if there is a 
"constant and regulated" or "exact and natural" relation between what we 
can say of the two things, or of the relations of their elements.33 Some of 
Leibniz's examples suggest that there must indeed be a one-to-one corre- 
spondence between the elements of the expressing entity and the elements 
of the expressed. (This is suggested, for  example, by his description of a 
geometrical projection expressing the figure projected: "each point of the one 
corresponding, following a certain relation, to each point on the other" 
[N.E. 11, viii, $13: D.A. ed., p. 1311.) If such a condition is intended, then (it 
seems), a perception can express a colored object only if thereis an element in 
the perception corresponding to every feature of the colored object (e.g., each 
feature of its surface that gives rise to its reflective properties). And by this 
reasoning we would arrive again a t  the full-blooded Leibnizian view that 
every sense perception is implicitly as complex as its infinitely complex cause. 
However, some of Leibniz's own examples of expression-models and 
maps34-indicate that he probably does not intend this improbably strong 
position when he defines 'expression.' The important point is that even if 
exact o r  one-to-one correspondence is not required, the theory of expression 
will still require some "regulated" relation between the features of the 
perception and features of the perceived. And this, I presume, would require 
some sort of internal complexity in the perceptions themselves. But suppose 
Locke and Leibniz are right in saying that the perception of a splotch of red or  
blue of a single shade is (at least) apparently homogeneous. It will follow 
immediately that there is a n  implicit o r  unrecognized internal complexity in 
such perceptions-and hence that they are, on Leibniz's definitions, confused. 
I d o  not, of course, present these observations as any sort of defense of 
Leibniz's conception of sense perceptions as intrinsically "confused." What 
I have tried to suggest is that the theory should not be rejected either as 
transparently false, or as entirely dependent on transparently outdated 
premisses. 
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